LEBANON: DEFMIN MURR MAKES A PLEA FOR MORE U.S.. MILITARY SUPPORT, DISCUSSES UPCOMING ELECTIONS

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"?? ???? ???????? ?? ????? ??? 2040".-�?????? ???????? ????? ???????: ??? ????? ????? ??? ??????? ?? ????? ??? ??????? ?????? ?? ???????? ?????? ??? ?????? ?????? ????? ????? 14 ???? ???? ??????? ???????? ???? ?????? ???? ?? ??? ???? ????? ?? ???? ????? ??? ???? ?????? ????? ?????? ??????????? ??? ????? ?? ??????.SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELAALSO FOR PM ACTING A/S RUGGIEROP FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMYUSUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUERNSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTTDOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2019TAGS: PREL, MCAP, PGOV, PTER, PINR, MARR, MOPS, LESUBJECT: LEBANON: DEFMIN MURR MAKES A PLEA FOR MORE U.S.MILITARY SUPPORT, DISCUSSES UPCOMING ELECTIONS REF: A. BEIRUT 383B. BEIRUT 373C. BEIRUT 235D. 2008 BEIRUT 1780 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY-------- 1. (C) On the eve of his trip to Washington, Defense MinisterElias Murr discussed the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) manysuccesses and credited U.S. military assistance. Deeplyappreciative of U.S. support, Murr, a leader within Lebanon'sGreek Orthodox community, made a plea for an additionalclose-air support deliverable to demonstrate to moderateLebanese Christians (whose votes key swing districts areexpected to determine the outcome of the June 7 parliamentaryelections) and continued U.S. support for the moderates inLebanon. Noting that Russia remained intent on providingMiG-29 fighter aircraft to the LAF, Murr remained firm thatLebanon would not accept this delivery "before 2040." Backedup by poll results, Murr predicted that his father, MP MichelMurr, and seven allied March 14 candidates in the key Metndistrict would defeat Free Patriotic Movement leader MichelAoun by winning all eight seats, if/if neutral votingofficials manned the polling places. Murr was less certainin other districts, criticizing several of the March 14leaders for internal bickering over seats. According toMurr, President Michel Sleiman was disappointed independentChristian candidates were pulling out of the race and wasalso feeling increasingly frustrated with Hizballah. Endsummary. LAF SUCCESSES ARISINGFROM U.S. SUPPORT--------------------- 2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by PolOff, met withDefense Minister Elias Murr at his home in Rabieh April 4, onthe eve of Murr's departure for Washington. They spoke ofthe many successes resulting from the U.S. assistance to theLebanese Armed Forces (LAF), including the LAF's ongoingcounterterrorism efforts, its work in Nahr al-Barid and otherPalestinian refugee camps, its joint patrols with UNIFIL andimplementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 incontrolling the area south of the Litani River, the LAFCommon Border Force plan in curbing weapons smuggling fromthe northern and eastern borders, and the destruction of ManPortable Air Defense System (MANPADS) missiles in LAF depots(Ref B). Murr also mentioned the LAF's perfect record ofend-use accountability. MURR MAKES A PLEA FOR ANOTHERDELIVERABLE FROM THE U.S.----------------------------- 3. (C) Looking forward to meeting SecDef Gates and other U.S.officials in Washington, Murr noted that he would be thefirst Christian political figure from the Middle East to goto Washington since Obama's election. Appreciative of theanticipated May shipment of military equipment from the U.S.(Ref C) and the impending arrival of the Caravan, Murr made aplea for the announcement of an additional close-air supportdeliverable from the U.S. during his trip. Murr requested"some sort of aviation to sell to Christian voters during theelections." He clarified that he knew it was unreasonable toexpect an actual deliverable before the June 7 parliamentaryelections, but argued that an announcement of something tocome from the U.S. would be ideal in demonstrating continuedU.S. support for the moderates in Lebanon. He also suggestedthat a U.S. push for UAE provision of 10 Hawks (from theUAE's inventory of 30 Hawks to be retired) would be welcome. 4. (C) Murr feared Hizballah and Free Patriotic Movementopposition Christian leader Michel Aoun would attack him inthe headlines if he returned from the U.S. "empty-handed." BEIRUT 00000400 002 OF 003 He stressed that he remained firmly opposed to Hizballah,saying, "I paid too much to change my policy," referring tothe 2005 assassination attempt against him. The Ambassadorand Murr also discussed ongoing counterterrorism cooperation. RUSSIA STILL INTENTTO GIVE MIG-29S------------------- 5. (C) Murr relayed that the Russian Defense Minister wantsto visit Lebanon. He added that the Russians have beenasking when the LAF officers would go to Russia for trainingon the MiG-29s it offered to the LAF in December (Ref D).Murr said he had already begun hinting to the Russians thathe did not want the fighter aircraft. He reiterated to theAmbassador that Lebanon would not be accepting the MiG-29sfor a long time, "not before 2040!" he stressed. EXPECTS MARCH 14TO WIN METN---------------- 6. (C) Murr is the scion of the Metn district's pre-eminentpolitical family. Metn remains a critical electoraldistrict, Murr reasoned, explaining that if March 14 can winthe seven of eight seats Aoun's bloc currently holds in Metn,it will retain the majority in parliament. Murr argued thatif Aoun lost the Metn seats, it would give President MichelSleiman the ability to form his own bloc of parliamentarianspost-election. This could lead to division of the 30 seatsin the next cabinet on the basis of ten-ten-ten (March 14,March 8, and President Sleiman). 7. (C) Producing a "house-by-house" poll his father, MPMichel Murr, had conducted on April 1 in their Metn district,Murr concluded that his father's list would win by 6,000votes over Aoun's list. He said the Murrs would not publishthe results so that Aoun would continue to believe he wouldwin seven of the district's eight seats (the eighth going toMichel Murr). MARCH 14INTERNAL FRICTION----------------- 8. (C) Expressing cautious optimism about March 14's overallprospects in the elections, Murr noted with approval thatmajority leader Saad Hariri had become much more focused onthe elections recently. However, he said, Druze leader WalidJumblatt has been "hurting March 14 in the Christian regions"because of his perceived overtures to Hizballah. Sighing, headded, "We would win it all if (Kataeb leader and formerpresident Amine) Gemayel and (Lebanese Forces leader Samir)Geagea were not involved -- people do not like either ofthem." 9. (C) Murr said he was concerned that March 14 still had notdecided which candidates would run for each district. Itneeded to happen soon, he argued, so that March 14 couldfocus on putting out its message -- that voters will bechoosing between an army, a government and a republic (March14), or an army within an army, a government within agovernment and a state within a state (Hizballah-ledopposition.) Murr claimed that Saad Hariri had not yetreceived campaign financing from the Saudis and wonderedwhether the Saudis were stalling or had decided to forgofinancing March 14's campaign. CONCERNED ABOUT NEUTRALITYOF POLLING STATIONS-------------------------- 10. (C) Worried about the neutrality of those operating thepolling places on election day, Murr said he will requestfrom the Interior Ministry the names of all of the employeesnominated to work at Metn's polling places. He said hewanted to make sure that Aoun supporters do not try to derailthe process by, for example, finding fault with legitimate BEIRUT 00000400 003 OF 003 identification cards. He would check all of the names withthe LAF G-2 (military intelligence), he said, beforeapproving their appointments. SLEIMAN: "I WILL FIGHTHIZBALLAH TO THE END"----------------------- 11. (C) Recounting a recent conversation with PresidentSleiman, Murr said that the president was disappointed thatthe independent Christians were choosing not to run in theelection, citing prominent industrialist Nemat Frem inparticular. Sleiman reportedly conveyed to Murr hisfrustration with Hizballah, saying, "I will fight Hizballahto the end." Murr said he sensed a change in Sleiman'sattitude toward Hizballah from when he was LAF Commander andbelieves that Sleiman is feeling increasingly hindered byHizballah, hence the hardening of his attitude. 12. (C) Murr posited that Sleiman had expected Hizballahwould not compete strongly against the President's formeraide, Nazem Khoury, for a seat in Jbeil district. Sleimanrealized now, however, that Hizballah would not make such anagreement and would strongly support its political allyMichel Aoun against Christian candidates, including Khoury.Sleiman saw that Hizballah's only "gift" to Sleiman was thepresidency, Murr said. Murr claimed that Interior MinisterZiad Baroud had been making frequent visits to Michel Aoun'sresidence, which is near Murr's. When he passed thisinformation on to Sleiman, Murr said, the presidentthreatened Baroud with making him resign. (Note: Baroud andMurr hold two of the three ministries appointed by thepresident. End note.)SISON �id: 126143date: 10/18/2007 7:40refid: 07BEIRUT1626origin: Embassy Beirutclassification: SECRETdestination:header:VZCZCXRO2697OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROVDE RUEHLB #1626/01 2910740ZNY SSSSS ZZHO 180740Z OCT 07FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUTTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9759INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 0769RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITYRHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITYRUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1593RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1730RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITYRHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY----------------- header ends ----------------S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001626 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2017TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, PARM, SY, IS, LESUBJECT: LEBANON: SLEIMAN DISAPPOINTS IN MEETING WITH USDPEDELMAN BEIRUT 00001626 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b)and (d). SUMMARY------- 1. (C) In an October 16 meeting with visiting Under Secretaryof Defense for Policy (USDP) Eric S. Edelman and DeputyAssistant Secretary for Defense (DASD) Mark T. Kimmitt, adefensive Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Sleimanbristled at USG offers to participate in after action reviewswith LAF soldiers and cited potential security risks posed bythe upcoming presidential election as his grounds forpostponing planned DOD training. Sleiman did, however,express appreciation for USG support for the LAF during itsrecent battle against extremists in the Nahr al-BaridPalestinian camp. INCREASING MIL-TO-MIL COOPERATION--------------------------------- 2. (C) USDP Edelman, DASD Mark T. Kimmitt, the Ambassador,Defense Attache, Pol/Econ Chief, USDP Military Assistant, OSDLebanon Desk Officer, OSD Foreign Area Officer met withLebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander General Michel Sleimanfor a half hour on October 16 at the General's office inYarze. USDP Edelman began by conveying Secretary Gates'congratulations for the LAF's victory against Fatah al-Islam(FAI) militants in the Nahr al-Barid Palestinian camp, anespecially heroic undertaking given the urban warfareenvironment the LAF faced. As a result, the LAF's estimationhas increased in the eyes of the U.S. military and U.S.government, Edelman said. 3. (S) Secretary Gates asked Edelman to visit Lebanon topursue a longer term mil-to-mil relationship, he continued,adding that he planned to propose to Defense Minister EliasMurr the creation of a bilateral working group in a meetingscheduled later that day (septel). This group would help theU.S. military understand the long-term needs of the LAF andenable the USG to continue to provide sustainable supportover the long term. Edelman concluded that he looked forwardto a productive relationship. 4. (S) Sleiman thanked the USDP for the U.S. militaryassistance, noting that recently there had been a qualitativeand quantitative increase in support, especially with theammunition provided to help the LAF at Nahr al-Barid, as wellas the $270 million supplemental, materiel support, and otherfunding approved for the upcoming year. Sleiman also lookedforward to developing "human" relationships through increasedtraining, given that both militaries were waging the same waron terrorism. USDP Edelman agreed that too often the focuswas on hardware, whereas what was really important was thepersistent military-to-military contact. It is now up to usto define a program that encapsulates this concept, he said. SLEIMAN DEFENSIVE ON CANCELED U.S. MILITARY VISITS--------------------------------------------- ------ 5. (S) USDP Edelman then raised Sleiman's last-minutecancellation of two planned U.S. military teams, one toparticipate in an After Action Review (AAR) of the LAF'sperformance at Nahr al-Barid to learn from shared experiencesand to help define the requirements for future training, andanother to provide an on-site assessment for theComprehensive Training Program (CTP). Sleiman, citing badtiming as the grounds for the cancellations, initially saidthe LAF was preoccupied with the security situation in thesouth and Nahr al-Barid and could not spare enough officersand did not have enough time to prepare for the visits. 6. (S) Furthermore, he said somewhat defensively, we need todo an in-house analysis first, before we get others involved;would the U.S. let its army be subject to outside review? Weare willing to exchange information, he said, but not inresponse to U.S. critiques. Edelman responded that thepurpose of the AAR was an assessment, not an investigation,and that the U.S. military routinely did joint assessmentswith other countries. The idea was not to assign blame, butto identify things that could be done differently, or what BEIRUT 00001626 002.2 OF 002 difference other types of equipment or training could havemade. DASD Kimmitt added that the role of the U.S.participants was not judges or investigators, butfacilitators to help senior commanders discover theon-the-ground battlefield issues to help them make betterdecisions in the future. It was an exercise inself-examination that the U.S. military also practiced,enabling it to perform better, even if some egos were bruisedalong the way. 7. (S) Sleiman, reluctantly it seemed, agreed that such ameeting could occur at the commander level, but that LAFcommanders would then be the ones to communicate the resultsto the lower ranks. Reiterating that the review should firstbe conducted internally at the staff level, Sleiman said onlythen would it be ready to discuss and learn from the U.S. Itwould be too difficult to explain the concept to the lowerranks, he claimed, adding, "this is the reality." 8. (S) The Ambassador said he was even more concerned aboutthe cancellation of a visit scheduled the following week toassess training needs and plan for comprehensive trainingmissions, stressing that if the training is delayed, the LAFrisks losing USG support. Edelman added that Congress wouldbe monitoring the U.S. military's ability to execute theprogram and, to ensure future Congressional support andfunding, it was necessary to demonstrate progress soonerrather than later. Sleiman protested that he did not say noto the training, but that next week was a busy week for theLAF, which would be on missions to maintain security duringthe parliamentary session scheduled for October 23 to electLebanon's next president, when demonstrations might occur.DASD Kimmitt noted that this would provide an ideal time toprovide on-the-job training assessment as the team could seethe LAF in action. Sleiman finally agreed that the teamcould come before January, but they could not go intodowntown Beirut. Access is what is most important, theAmbassador stressed; the training assessment cannot belimited to a small number of people that does not include alllevels of the Army. COMMENT------- 9. (S) While he seldom impresses officials, this meetingwas LAF Commander Sleiman's worst performance with a USGvisitor in years. At times, his savvy LAF interpreter, whorecognized the poor impression his boss was making on animportant delegation, chose to freelance rather than renderan accurate translation of the defensive language Sleiman wasactually using. After we built a closer cooperation withSleiman during the Nahr al-Barid battle, the USG relationshipwith Sleiman today seems to be on a deteriorating, downwardslope. We guess that this is due in large measure toSleiman's calculation that we do not support his presidentialbid, while Syria does. One of the many very good reasons forLebanon to have presidential elections on time and accordingto Lebanon's established constitution is so that thetransition in the LAF command (linked to a new presidentbeginning his term in office) will occur on schedule as well.Luckily, the LAF command below Sleiman and the politicalleadership above Sleiman -- particularly Defense MinisterMurr (see septel) -- is absolutely committed to a strong,mutually beneficial mil-mil partnership with the USG. 10. (U) USDP Edelman has cleared this cable.FELTMAN�LEBANON: LAF COMMANDER SLEIMAN POSTURES AS LEBANESE NATIONALIST id: 126489date: 10/22/2007 4:48refid: 07BEIRUT1641origin: Embassy Beirutclassification: SECRETdestination: 07BEIRUT1626|07BEIRUT1641header:VZCZCXRO5380OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROVDE RUEHLB #1641/01 2950448ZNY SSSSS ZZHO 220448Z OCT 07FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUTTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9782INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 0776RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITYRHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITYRHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITYRUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1741----------------- header ends ----------------S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001641 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA FRONT OFFICE AND NEA/ELA; NSC FORABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2027TAGS: PREL, KDEM, PARM, LE, SYSUBJECT: LEBANON: LAF COMMANDER SLEIMAN POSTURES ASLEBANESE NATIONALIST REF: BEIRUT 1626 BEIRUT 00001641 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY------- 1. (S) Over an extended one-on-one dinner with theAmbassador on 10/18, Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) CommanderMichel Sleiman (whose dinner invitation, we believe, stemmedfrom recognition of the abysmal impression he made on UnderSecretary of Defense Edelman two days earlier, reftel) SIPDISexpressed frustration at being suspected as a Syrian agent.He claimed that his primary motivation was preserving theLAF's unity, and he expressed gratitude for USG support forthe army. Sleiman spoke with bitterness of pettyhumiliations inflicted by President Emile Lahoud, whoseorders he claimed to have defied when Lahoud operated againstLebanese national interest. While Sleiman claimed not to bedriven by presidential ambition, his frequent praise of SaadHariri (presumed to be the next prime minister) suggestedthat he was subtly reassuring us about how he would behave ashead of state. Sleiman expressed worry about Syrian designson Lebanon, and he hoped that March 14 would not fall intothe Syrian trap by electing a "half-plus-one" president.While understanding the Ambassador's point about the armyneeding to protect the legitimate national institutions andadamant that the LAF would never protect a constitutionallyillegal government, Sleiman thought that, in aconfrontational situation, the LAF would likely be forced toremain neutral, on the sidelines. Sleiman also fretted aboutthe neglected Akkar region in north Lebanon, hoping that theLAF and Saad Hariri develop an informal partnership to keepAkkar from falling under Sunni extremist or Syrianinterference. End summary. MEDIA ALLEGATIONS ABOUT U.S. MILITARY BASES:LAF, NOT USG, IS THE REAL TARGET-------------------------------- 2. (S) Late on 10/17, LAF Commander Sleiman invited theAmbassador to a one-on-one dinner the following night at theYarze Officers Club. We believe that the 10/18 dinner, whichlasted three and a half hours, stemmed from Sleiman'srecognition that he had to do something to make up for hispoor performance in his 10/16 meeting with Under Secretary ofDefense for Policy Edelman (reftel). Despite the uproar inthe pro-Syrian media alleging that Edelman's visit wasputting the finishing touches on U.S. plans to establishmilitary bases in Lebanon from which we would attack Syria,over dinner Sleiman confidently exuded praise for U.S.assistance to Lebanon and U/S Edelman's offer to establish abilateral defense committee. Sleiman and the Ambassadorcompared notes on how to counter the media campaign againstthe U.S. military assistance, which Sleiman agreed wasdesigned to make it as politically difficult as possible forthe LAF to receive U.S. help. The attack against the U.S.assistance was actually an attack against the LAF, Sleimannoted, while reiterating his commitment to the U.S.-Lebanesepartnership. PRESERVING LAF UNITY MEANSAVOIDANCE OF PROVOKING SYRIA---------------------------- 3. (S) Asked who was behind the media campaign, Sleimanresponded "Syria." Syria has never wanted a strong Lebanesearmy. While Syria cannot publicly attack the army, it canundermine the LAF in various ways, including by inventinglies about U.S. assistance. The Ambassador asked Sleimanabout references he made during the Nahr al-Barid fight toSyrian assistance to the LAF. Syria, Sleiman said, hasoffered help and training from time to time. But becauseSyria is so much more powerful than Lebanon, it is importantthat Lebanon do nothing that might provoke Syria's wrath.Going on at some length, Sleiman expressed frustration thathis attempts to protect the LAF from Syrian interference haveled many to call him a Syrian agent. Yes, he said, hecultivates good relations with Syrian officers and Syrianleaders. But what is his choice? The LAF could not longsurvive being seen as an enemy force hostile to Syria. Withthe LAF itself as divided as Lebanese society, "you must BEIRUT 00001641 002.2 OF 004 understand" how hard it is to promote LAF unity, Sleimansaid, claiming that such unity is his primary motivation andobjective. Lebanon itself and the LAF in particular had totake the extra steps to avoid confrontation with Syria. 4. (S) Sleiman then raised Syrian President Basharal-Asad's just-concluded trip to Turkey. What Bashar said inTurkey is worrying, Sleiman noted. The way Bashar describedTurkey's fight against the PKK sounded like a "rehearsal" ofhow Bashar would describe Syria's fight against Lebanon.Sleiman said that it was very important that March 14 leadersavoid any Syrian traps that would be used as pretexts forSyria's direct interference in Lebanon. The March 14 threatof having a March 14 president elected by an absolutemajority would be a catastrophe, Sleiman noted, as Syriasimply will not tolerate a March 14 president and a March 14PM and a March 14-dominated cabinet. Syria is alreadybuilding a case that March 14 is a hostile force, and March14 should work to find a candidate who can win broadersupport, to frustrate Syria's plans to use the street toundermine the presidential results. SUPPOSEDLY NOT SEEKING PRESIDENCY,BUT CULTIVATING GOOD RELATIONS WITH SAAD-------------------------------- 5. (S) The Ambassador asked Sleiman about his ownpresidential ambitions. Sleiman repeated his usual formulaabout caring primarily for the LAF ("I love the army," was afrequent refrain of the dinner) but hoping as well torepresent the Maronites in a political role later. Hedescribed his qualifications as honesty, experience, and"love of Lebanon." He claimed not to be clamoring for thetop job. He expressed what sounded to be genuine respect forWalid Jumblatt for telling him frankly that he did notsupport amending the constitution to permit a Sleimanpresidency. As for relations with PM Siniora (which we knoware not good), Sleiman said that he sympathized with thedifficult political and security circumstances under whichSiniora had to labor. Throughout the conversation, Sleimantalked with enthusiasm about his relationship with Ministerof Defense Elias Murr and, especially, the personal rapportthat he feels has developed between himself and MP SaadHariri. At several points, Sleiman brought the conversationback around to how impressed he is with Saad Hariri. Onereason why Lebanon's Sunnis have suddenly "discovered" theLAF, Sleiman claimed, was because of Saad's strong support. EMILE LAHOUD: NOW, THERE'S A SYRIAN AGENT--------------------------------- 6. (S) In contrast to his warm relations with Saad, Sleimanexpressed resentment and frustration regarding hisrelationship with Lebanese President Emile Lahoud. As aformer commander himself, Lahoud often goes behind Sleiman'sback, contacting LAF officers directly in ways thatundermined Sleiman's authority. Lahoud relied on Lebanesesecurity officers allied with Syria, including three of thefour generals now in jail for suspected involvement in theHariri assassination, to spy on Sleiman and bypass him.Sleiman drew a strong distinction between his own relationswith Syria, which he described as correct and designed toprotect Lebanon and the army, and Lahoud's obsequioussubmission to Damascus' will. Sleiman said Lahoud humiliatedhimself in an attempt to cater to Syria's wishes, whileSleiman kept Lebanon's interest first and foremost in hismind. 7. (S) There were many times over the past three years inparticular, Sleiman said, when he defied direct orders fromLahoud that he believed contradicted Lebanon's nationalinterest. As the post-Taif constitution notes (in Article49) that the LAF falls under the authority of the Council ofMinisters, Sleiman argued that he was justified in ignoringLahoud's orders, which he said included preventing andbreaking up the spring 2005 "Cedar Revolution"demonstrations. Lahoud also berated Sleiman for the simplecourtesy of paying a condolence call on the Hariri familyafter Rafiq Hariri's murder, and Lahoud tried to get Sleimanto refuse to deploy the LAF to protect the mourners atHariri's funeral. Lebanon will be much better off whenLahoud leaves office, Sleiman said. BEIRUT 00001641 003.2 OF 004 LAF TO PROTECT LEGITIMATE GOL INSTITUTIONS,BUT LAF MAY NOT BE ABLE TO INTERVENE IN STREET--------------------------------- 8. (S) But will Lahoud leave office, the Ambassador asked.Noting that signs point increasingly to a situation where thestatus quo is extended well beyond the constitutionalexpiration of Lahoud's term, the Ambassador asked Sleiman forhis view on what is going to happen regarding presidentialelections. Sleman calculated that the most likely scenariois that Lahoud will find an excuse to stay in Baabda Palaceunconstitutionally. Taking some credit for the apparent dropof support for a second cabinet scenario, Sleiman said thatthe LAF would "never" support a second, unconstitutionalcabinet. The Ambassador emphasized how important it was forthe LAF to support and protect the legitimate, constitutionalorgans of the state. The U.S. partnership depended on theLAF staying on the side of legitimacy, the Ambassadoremphasized. 9. (S) Sleiman agreed that the LAF could not and would notside with usurpers of constitutional power, although hedeemed unlikely the Ambassador's suggestion that thepresidential guards could be withdrawn from Baabda Palace atthe conclusion of Lahoud's term, thus exposing Emile Lahoudto potential expulsion from Baabda. Sleiman said that thetrouble would be if street violence breaks out betweenLebanon's feuding political factions, Then the LAF may havelittle choice but to stay on the sidelines, rather than riskhaving the LAF splinter. So, while the LAF would continue toprotect GOL institutions like the Grand Serail, ministries,and Central Bank, the LAF might not be able to keeppeace inthe streets. WORRIES ABOUT AKKAR------------------ 10. (S) Moving back to his praise of Saad Hariri, Sleimansaid that he is worried about the impoverished, neglected,Sunni-dominated Akkar region of north Lebanon. He said thatthere needs to be partnership between Saad, the Sunnis ofAkkar, and the LAF, to give the Akkar residents a sense ofhope. Saad can provide funding for charitable works, and theLAF can provide jobs and a sense of purpose. Akkar risksfalling under the sway of Sunni fundamentalists who wil bemanipulated by Damascus and perhaps even provide a pretextfor direct Syrian intervention in Lebanon. If Akkar falls toSyria, then so does Lebanon, Sleiman warned. The Ambassadornoted that the USG is stepping up its own activities inAkkar, and Sleiman urged that we help focus Saad in thisdirection. One problem, the Ambassador noted, is thatbecause of the amount of Sunni fundamentalism, Haririfinancing could end up backfiring politically, if Syria wouldaccuse Saad of providing money to extremists. Sleimanconcurred but thought the risks of doing nothing greater thanthe risks of some dollars going astray. COMMENT------- 11. (S) If Sleiman was putting on an act, he mostly pulledit off. He came across more convincingly as a Lebanesepatriot than we have ever seen him in the formal, stiffmeetings in his office. The improved impression he madesurely stemmed in part from the extended conversation andrelaxed setting, with Sleiman lubicated by Scotch andfeeling comfortable in mixin up French, English, and Arabicoften in the sam sentence (and with the Ambassador relievedto rspond in kind). If his purpose was to convince us thathe is not simply a Syrian agent, he largely succeeded; hismotivation is no doubt related to his understanding of Syrianwishes, but there are clearly other factors at play in hiscalculations as well. 12. (S) But if he hoped to persuade us that he is alsoappropriate presidential material (as his frequent warmreferences to PM-in-waiting Saad Hariri suggest), we remainskeptical. Perhaps in self-conscious recognition that hedoes not come from one of Lebanon's political or businessdynasties, he seems too concerned with slights and toosusceptible to perceived humiliations to be an effective BEIRUT 00001641 004.2 OF 004 leader. For example, we believe that the bad relationshipbetween Sleiman and PM Siniora, both of whom are proud,self-made men from humble provincial backgrounds, is based inlarge measure by each man's perception that the other doesnot accord proper deference. And, more damaging to our viewof the Commander, we remember how Sleiman blinked at thebeginning of the Nahr al-Barid battle, proceeding only whenpushed to do so from above (by Murr, Siniora, Hariri, etc.)and from below (by officers and soldiers appalled at the lostof LAF life). 13. (S) Still, with this dinner, Sleiman unexpectedlydemonstrated a type of political courage. Rejecting theAmbassador's offer to get together at another time when theU.S.-Lebanese mil-mil relationship was not headline news,Sleiman hosted he Ambassador in a relatively public settingon the very night when the pro-Syrian media was feasting onthe cooked-up stories of U.S. military bases in Lebanon.Throughout the dinner, both Sleiman and the Ambassadorreceived frequent phone calls with updates about whatoutrageous claims were being broadcast and debated. Yet theCommander made an ostensible show of making sure that otherofficers at Yarze that night knew that he and the Ambassadorwere having a good time, not a difficult discussion (althoughthere was some of that, too). This dinner, in other words,was surely intended as a signal that Sleiman was not inclinedto allow the ugly media campaign undermine the growingU.S.-Lebanese military cooperation. If the other officersdining at Yarze that night told their families and friendsthat the Commander seems to have a fine relationship with theUnited States, Sleiman probably calculated that such rumorswould not hurt his presidential ambitions, either.FELTMAN��LEBANON: SINIORA ADVOCATES PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE BASED ON PRINCIPLES id: 127819date: 10/30/2007 13:59refid: 07BEIRUT1699origin: Embassy Beirutclassification: SECRETdestination: 07SECSTATE148539header:VZCZCXRO2960PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROVDE RUEHLB #1699/01 3031359ZNY SSSSS ZZHP 301359Z OCT 07FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUTTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9903INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVERUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVERUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0817RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1796RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FLRHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC----------------- header ends ----------------S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001699 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2027TAGS: PGOV, PREL, LESUBJECT: LEBANON: SINIORA ADVOCATES PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATEBASED ON PRINCIPLES REF: SECSTATE 148539 BEIRUT 00001699 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY-------- 1. (C) In a 10/29 meeting with the Ambassador, PrimeMinister Fouad Siniora recommended simultaneous pursuit oftwo options regarding presidential elections. First, heurged continued push for an absolute majority ("half plusone") election, despite the fact that March 14 might not beable to pull it off and that Patriarch Sfeir does not likeit. Second, he asked that the USG help lock in agreement ona set of principles (for example, UNSCR 1701, Siniora'sseven-point plan, and the National Dialogue's four decisions)that would bind the elected president and subsequentgovernment. He suggested exploring this approach when theSecretary meets her counterparts in Istanbul. Siniora also SIPDISmused that the Patriarch might ultimately give names, but hisexpectations regarding the quality of candidates thePatriarch might name were low. In the event of a vacuum,Siniora believes the more likely outcome is that PresidentLahoud will stay in office, extending the status quo, ratherthan form a second government. Regarding fund-raisingefforts for the Special Tribunal, Siniora reported that hesuggested to the UN Secretary General that the UN and Lebanonundertake joint efforts. He also made a pitch for help inreforestation, after devastating forest fires in Lebanon'snorth and Chouf regions. End summary. STRATEGY FOR SUCCESSFUL ELECTIONS------------------------------- 2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by PolOff, met with PrimeMinister Fouad Siniora and advisor Mohamad Chatah on October29. The Ambassador opened the meeting by briefing Siniora onthe message the U.S. is delivering regarding potentialactions that might be taken against individuals whoparticipate in a second cabinet or who take steps toundermine Lebanon's legitimate institutions. The PMexpressed appreciation. 3. (C) Regarding Secretary Rice's upcoming Istanbulmeeting, Siniora laid out two tracks that he sees arepossible outcomes of the elections and how the USG can play asupporting role. He dubbed the first the "confrontationtrack," whereby a president is elected with a half plus onemajority. The Patriarch, he noted, does not support thistrack because he fears the consequences. The Patriarch alsoopposes a vacuum in the presidency during which the Sinioragovernment fills the void. Siniora remarked that movingforward without the Patriarch's support is "suicide." Theconfrontation track assumes that March 14 is able to garner ahalf plus one majority, an assumption which is not adone-deal, commented Siniora. 4. (C) The second track is to elect a president who meets aminimum set of requirements by supporting specificprinciples: support for UNSCR 1701 (emphasis on disarmingHizballah), the seven-point proposal Siniora put forward toend the summer 2006 war and the four decisions resulting fromthe spring 2006 National Dialogue. Whoever is elected,Siniora posited, should then be bound by these principles. 5. (C) Siniora recommended that the first track - half plusone strategy - remain on the table as a driving forceencouraging MPs to attend the parliamentary session,regardless of whether it is achievable by March 14. (Siniorareported that he believes France will accept a candidateelected with a half plus one majority, but would prefer toavoid this scenario.) At the same time, Siniora urged that,simultaneously, we also pursue the second track. Pursuingthis second track entails assessing how to improve thechances of a candidate who supports the identifiedprinciples, and then soliciting support from the Patriarch,the Vatican, and other countries for this strategy. Siniorarecommended that Secretary Rice work on these agreedprinciples with the attendees at her side-meetings inIstanbul. It would also be beneficial for the USG toemphasize, in Istanbul and externally, the MPs' civicobligation to vote. Siniora emphasized that the Patriarchmust play an active role in this process because the BEIRUT 00001699 002.2 OF 004 Patriarch may decide to suggest names, irrespective of theprincipled approach, out of fear of a vacuum or a half plusone president. IF THE PATRIARCH SUGGESTS NAMES...------------------------------- 6. (C) Siniora relayed that he sent a representative (RadwanSayegh) to visit the Patriarch on October 27 and, from thisvisit, got the impression that the Patriarch may ultimatelychoose to suggest names, one from pro-government forces, onefrom the opposition, and one who falls in the middle.Siniora noted that in such a scenario, the candidate whofalls in the middle would most likely be the winner. Sinioraspeculated that, ideally, the Patriarch might suggest someoneyoung and new. On the other hand, he expected that any namesfrom the Patriarch could include former Bar Association headShakib Qortbawi, from the National Bloc, and former PresidentAmine Gemayel -- neither of whom qualify as being young ornew. He did not think the Patriarch would choose formerMinister of Finance Demianos Kattar. Siniora said he willtry to find out whether the Patriarch is still supportingJohn Obeid, Fares Bouez or Charles Rizk, and he will alsopress the Patriarch to support the second track based onagreed principles. 7. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's suggestion that thePatriarch announce his intention to attend the November 12parliament session himself in order to build momentum for MPattendance, Siniora was receptive, on the condition thatSpeaker Nabih Berri does indeed call for the session.However, if Berri does not call for one, then it would be toodivisive for the Patriarch to show up. He said that MPMichel Murr has been the most outspoken in supporting thisidea. 8. (C) Siniora did not appear confident that the recentflurry of meetings between party leaders will produce abreakthrough. However, he was more optimistic about tangibleresults from Saudi King Abdallah bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud'smeeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel and SecretaryRice's meetings in Istanbul. He also said that he will askActing Foreign Minister Tareq Mitri, currently in Geneva, tomeet with the Vatican's Secretary for Relations with StatesArchbishop Dominique Mamberti. LAHOUD LIKELY TO STAY IN OFFICEIF NO PRESIDENT IS ELECTED------------------------------- 9. (C) Siniora reported that Egyptian Foreign Minister AhmedAboul Gheit, in his October 25th visit to Lebanon, did notsay he supported a constitutional amendment (despite mediareports to the contrary) and cautioned President Emile Lahoudagainst forming a second government. Siniora believes Lahoudis no longer considering forming a second government, butinstead is thinking to stay in office until a president iselected, regardless of what happens by the midnight November23 deadline. In the event that no president is elected,Lahoud (who denies the existence of the Siniora cabinet)believes his departure would create a vacuum, an outcome toavoid. REVIEWING OTHER CANDIDATES-------------------------- 10. (C) In response to the Ambassador's inquiry as to whetherthere is truth to the rumor that former MP Suleiman Franjiehis plotting his candidacy while on a hunting trip to France,Siniora laughed. Noting that Franjieh hoped to be elected ifthe March 14 majority became the parliamentary minority, thePM commented that the March 14 rejection of the two-thirdsquorum would then be a tool seized upon by Franjieh: "thatis the majority cooking the poison,, only so they are thenforced to eat it." Siniora labeled Franjieh's purported plota "fantasy." 11. (C) Upon hearing that Gilbert Chagoury, a Nigeria-basedwealthy industrialist known to have funded (and might stillbe doing so) Michel Aoun, is accompanying Franjieh in France,Siniora suggested that the U.S. deliver to Chagoury a sternmessage about the possibility of financial sanctions andtravel bans against those who undermine Lebanon's legitimateinstitutions. He also dismissed Central Bank Governor Riad BEIRUT 00001699 003.2 OF 004 Salameh's candidacy as implausible, calling it "too flagrantbecause it would be like electing Syrian President Basharal-Asad to be Lebanon's next president." On MP NassibLahoud, Siniora commented that he is the best half plus onecandidate and the only one from the entire list of Maronitepresidential candidates who deserves to be elected. SLEIMAN'S VISIT TO EGYPT------------------------ 12. (C) Siniora noted that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarakcalled to brief him on Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) CommanderMichel Sleiman's October 21 visit to Egypt. Mubarak relayedthat he focused the meeting on praising Sleiman for thearmy's efforts during the Nahr al Barid fighting. WhenSleiman told Mubarak that Lebanon needed a president thatpleases Syria, Mubarak agreed that positive relations withSyria are an important consideration, but that it should beon the basis of mutual respect. Mubarak told Siniora thatwas the extent of election-talk. 13. (C) Siniora acknowledged that Sleiman still appears tobe Syria's preferred candidate. As for himself, Siniora ismaintaining a positive relationship with Sleiman. He saidSleiman consulted with him prior to his visit to Egypt, andthen briefed him upon his return. He hears that Sleiman ismaking positive statements about him and he is doing thesame, praising his role as General. Along these lines,Siniora is planning to host an event with Sleiman, all of theofficers, and the heads of the Eighth Regiment to express hisappreciation for the LAF. FURTHER REFUTING OF U.S.MILITARY BASE RUMOR------------------------ 14. (C) Siniora and his advisors are strategizing on how toquell the continuing furor over the rumor that the U.S. plansto build military bases in Lebanon. Ideas include reachingout to retired military officers to make a statement andproviding statements to friendly, credible journalists.Meanwhile, Siniora asked the Ambassador to make a brief, firmstatement denying (again) the allegation. It is Siniora'sassessment that this entire ordeal was crafted by Syrianintelligence. Siniora stated his belief that additionalrefuting by the Ambassador would be helpful. (Note: PerSiniora's request, the Embassy issued a press statement laterthat day reiterating that the story is not true. End Note) SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FUNDING------------------------ 15. (C) When asked about funding progress for the SpecialTribunal, Siniora said he spoke to UN Secretary General BanKi Moon and suggested the UN and Lebanon join forces to reachout to potential donors to raise funds. Siniora is waitingfor an answer from the UN to his proposal. The Ambassadorinquired whether it might be a good idea for Naziq Hariri,Rafiq's widow, to undertake a fund-raising tour; Siniora (whodoes not like Nazek, who in turn detests him) wasnon-committal, noting that potential donors would wonder whyshe isn't footing the bill herself. 16. (C) Noting that the cabinet had approved the 2008budget with Special Tribunal funding included, Siniorareported that he was pleased with the eight-hour meeting ofthe Council of Ministers on October 27. Topics coveredincluded the 2008 budget, oil and transportation policies,and draft bills. He remarked that never before has the GOLdiscussed policies, but instead focused only on measures.The current government, in contrast, has managed to send over120 important bills to Parliament (even though the Parliamentis not meeting). FIRES DESTROYING YEARS OF TREE PLANTING-------------------------------- 17. (SBU) Siniora relayed his deep concern regarding thedevastation caused by Lebanon's fires, saying that the firesdestroyed more of the forest than that which has been plantedover the last 17 years. Currently the GOL is working with areforestation NGO and would appreciate any support the USGcould offer. (Note: the Ambassador made a disasterdeclaration to carry out clean up and reforestation in two of BEIRUT 00001699 004.2 OF 004 the affected areas, and post is investigating an offer fromthe U.S. Forest Service for additional assistance. End Note) FELTMAN�LEBANON: ARMY COMMANDER, HIS PRESIDENTIAL PROSPECTS DIMMING, MORE FORWARD-LEANING ON PRESERVING STABILITY id: 128618date: 11/5/2007 4:52refid: 07BEIRUT1723origin: Embassy Beirutclassification: SECRETdestination: 07STATE148539header:VZCZCXRO7623OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROVDE RUEHLB #1723/01 3090452ZNY SSSSS ZZHO 050452Z NOV 07 ZDSFM AMEMBASSY BEIRUTTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9950INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 0828RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITYRHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITYRHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITYRUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1814----------------- header ends ----------------S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001723 SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y -- PARA MARKINGS CORRECTED SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA FRONT OFFICE AND NEA/ELA; NSC FORABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2027TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, KDEM, LE, SYSUBJECT: LEBANON: ARMY COMMANDER, HIS PRESIDENTIALPROSPECTS DIMMING, MORE FORWARD-LEANING ON PRESERVINGSTABILITY REF: A. STATE 148539 B. BEIRUT 1641 BEIRUT 00001723 001.4 OF 003 Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY AND COMMENT------------------- 1. (S) In a one-on-one meeting with the Ambassador on10/30, Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleimansaid that the LAF would try to "freeze" the situation on theground, taking action against whichever side of Lebanon'scavernous political divide -- March 8-Aoun or March 14 --would try to change the status quo by force. This change inthinking (from the more passive neutrality he advocatedearlier) stemmed, he acknowledged, from recognition that theLAF would split apart if ordered to stay in the barracks incase violence erupted. Sleiman reacted favorably to themessage (ref A) about what steps the USG would take in caseof a second cabinet or extension of Emile Lahoud'spresidential term. Sleiman expressed exasperation at theglowing terms used by Hizballah and other pro-Syrians indescribing him. Claiming that Damascus itself is divided inits opinion of him, he mused that Hizballah's praise isdesigned to destroy, not promote, his potential as apresidential candidate. What Hizballah really wants, heinsisted, is an indefinite extension of the status quo. 2. (S) We believe that Sleiman's more constructive approachto the army's role in preventing or responding to violencestems from at least three factors. First, Defense MinisterMurr told us that he has worked on Sleiman. Second, WalidJumblatt made it clear that, should Sleiman order the LAF toits barracks in the case of March 8-provoked violence, Druseofficers and soldiers will break away, ruling out passivityas a real option if Sleiman wants to preserve LAF unity.Third, Sleiman hinted that his presidential prospects weredimming. He thus may be focused more on securing his legacyas commander (in hopes of later parlaying that into apolitical role) rather than on the possibility of becomingpresident now. Indeed, later in the week, the LAF issued acommunique denying that Sleiman is a candidate. WhileSleiman's stated position of the LAF's response to violenceis an improvement over what he told us only 12 days earlier(ref b), March 14 and GOL leaders still hope Sleiman will gofurther, in deploying the army as a preventive measure in thecoming days. End summary and comment. SLEIMAN'S THINKING HAS EVOLVED;LAF TO BE LESS PASSIVE, HE SAYS------------------------------- 3. (SBU) On 10/30, the Ambassador met with LAF CommanderMichel Sleiman one-on-one to go over ref A's message aboutwhat steps the USG is likely to take in terms of financialand travel sanctions, should Emile Lahoud stay in BaabdaPalace beyond his term's midnight 11/23 expiration or shouldthere be a second, illegal cabinet appointed. The LAF, theAmbassador underscored, must remain solidly on the side oflegitimacy. 4. (S) Noting that the USG message was "clear" and "verygood," Sleiman concurred. He noted that his own thinking hadevolved since the 10/18 dinner he hosted with the Ambassador(ref B). He no longer advocated ordering the LAF to retreatto the barracks in case of street violence that mightpotentially split the LAF. The very act of staying in thebarracks might split the LAF even more quickly than takingaction, he said. Instead, he wanted the LAF to "freeze" (aword he used several times) the situation on the ground. Nomatter how "hot" the political language between March 8-Aounand March 14, the security status quo must remain "frozen."The LAF would remain politically neutral, acting againstwhichever side tried to upset the security situation.Sleiman expressed hope that, by spreading word that the LAFwill not be passive and will act against anyone, no matterwhat the political allegiance, who commits violence, the LAFwill deter violence rather than have to act against it. Whenasked specifically if the LAF would protect the Grand Serail(seat of the cabinet) against March 8-Aoun attack, Sleimangave an unequivocal yes. BEIRUT 00001723 002.4 OF 003 SLEIMAN SUSPECTS HIZBALLAHWANTS TO BURN HIS CANDIDACY--------------------------- 5. (S) The Ambassador raised Sleiman's presidentialprospects, noting that Hizballah, Nabih Berri, and otherpro-Syrians continued to talk as though Sleiman was the onlypossible contender. While noting that no Lebanese presidentcould survive by being unrelentingly hostile to Syria,Sleiman expressed what sounded to be sincere exasperation.He insisted he is not campaigning for the presidency. Bycontinuing to praise him, Hizballah must be intentionallytrying to burn him. "Of course" people will be suspicious ofhis loyalties, if all of Syria's allies in Lebanon focus onlyon him. Lebanon must have good relations with Syria, butbased on mutual respect and not dependent on toleratingHizballah's arms indefinitely. 6. (S) Asked by the Ambassador why Hizballah would betrying to burn him, Sleiman said that he mused it was toeliminate a potential compromise, unifying figure. Hecalculated that Hizballah's real goal is to extend the statusquo indefinitely, in order to prevent any potential dealregarding its weapons, especially in advance of any U.S. dealwith or fight against Iran. The Syrians themselves, Sleimanclaimed, have a divided view of him. While Bashar al-Asadprobably "likes" him, Rustom Ghazaleh and Syrian MilitaryIntelligence detest him. "Khalasz (enough), forget it,"Sleiman said, waving his hand to cut off further discussionof the presidential race. (Later in the week, the LAF issueda communique stating that the commander is not a candidateand does not, per the constitution, even qualify to be acandidate.) ADVOCATING A SHIFT IN MURRFROM DEFENSE TO INTERIOR-------------------------- 7. (S) The Ambassador asked Sleiman one last questionregarding the presidency: whether he or someone else becamepresident, whom would he advise the prime minister-designateappoint as Minister of Defense? Would he support Elias Murrremaining in that position under the new cabinet? Sleimanacknowledged that Murr had contributed to the positivedevelopment in the LAF's relationship with the U.S. But, hesaid, he would recommend that Murr return to the Minister ofInterior slot he had under Rafiq Hariri's 2000-2004 cabinet.The Minister of Defense position, Sleiman explained, isn'tactually very important, especially if there is a goodrelationship between the president, prime minister, andcommander. But the Minister of Interior has direct controlover the Internal Security Forces (ISF, national police) andSurete General. Now, with a Sunni (Hassan Saba') serving asMinister of Interior over the ISF which is also commanded bya Sunni (Ashraf Rifi), it is "too easy" to claim that the ISFis turning into a Sunni militia. If Murr were Minister ofInterior, such allegations would be easily dismissed. Also,Surete General, headed by a Shia (Wafiq Jezzini), has toomany links with Hizballah. As a foe of Hizballah, Murr wouldreduce the linkages. COMMENT------- 8. (S) In the time since the commander hosted theAmbassador to an extended dinner on 10/18 (ref B), Sleiman'sthinking seems to have evolved in two significant areas.First, from riding high as the presumed front-runnerpresident-in-waiting, Sleiman now seems to grasp that hisprospects (at least for now) have seriously dimmed. Weattribute the precipitous plummeting of his chances (or, moreaccurately, the perception of his chances) to thecategorical, unyielding refusal of PM Siniora, WalidJumblatt, Samir Geagea and others to contemplate amending theconstitution. Whatever the sincerity of its sentiments, theLAF's communique that Sleiman is not a candidate reflects thereality of how his odds are viewed today compare to two weeksago. But we wouldn't cross Sleiman's name off theprospective presidential list quite yet. He could yet again,and easily, pop up as the candidate to beat, especially in BEIRUT 00001723 003.4 OF 003 case violence breaks out. 9. (S) The second area where Sleiman's thinking has evolvedsince 10/18 is related to the LAF's response should violencebreak out. Two weeks ago, Sleiman vowed to protect publicinstitutions but to keep the LAF away from any streetfighting. Now, he states that the LAF must "freeze" thesituation on the ground. We believe that this positiveevolution stems from three factors. First, Deputy PrimeMinister and Defense Minister Elias Murr has, we understand,being quietly working on Sleiman to convince him that theLAF's duty is to take action measures to preserve stability.Second, Walid Jumblatt has publicly stated that, were thearmy to retreat to the barracks in the face of March 8-Aounaggression, the Druse officers and soldiers would break awayin order to protect the Druse population from attack. Thismeans that Sleiman can no longer pretend that passivitypreserves LAF unity. Third, Sleiman's apparent recognitionthat he is less likely to achieve the presidency today mayhave focused him again on his legacy as a commander. He hasstated to us before that he wants to become involved incivilian politics, an ambition that arguably becomes harderto achieve if the LAF splits in his last weeks as commander. 10. (S) Walid Jumblatt, meeting with the Ambassador on 11/3,reported that LAF Chief of Staff Shawki Masri (the LAF'ssecond-ranking officer and someone close to Jumblatt) toldhim that, indeed, the LAF is now looking more carefully athow to respond aggressively to stop any street violence. InJumblatt's view, this is a positive development but not yetgood enough: Jumblatt hopes that the LAF will deploy soon invisible numbers in Beirut, to deter any violence before itoccurs. We know that PM Siniora agrees. While recognizinghow over-stretched the LAF already is, we plan to raise thiswith Murr, in hopes that he, too, will push the LAF in thisdirection. Preventing violence rather than being forced tostop violence should, in our view, be the goal, and one thatis consistent with Sleiman's focus on preserving LAF unity.FELTMAN�LEBANON: SAUDI AMBASSADOR OPPOSED TO "HALF PLUS ONE" BUT SEEKS MARCH 14 PRESIDENT id: 128619date: 11/5/2007 4:52refid: 07BEIRUT1724origin: Embassy Beirutclassification: SECRETdestination:header:VZCZCXRO7581OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROVDE RUEHLB #1724/01 3090452ZNY SSSSS ZZHO 050452Z NOV 07FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUTTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9953INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 0831RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITYRHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITYRHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITYRUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1817----------------- header ends ----------------S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 001724 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA FRONT OFFICE AND NEA/ELA; NSC FORABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2027TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KDEM, PTER, LE, SY, SASUBJECT: LEBANON: SAUDI AMBASSADOR OPPOSED TO "HALF PLUSONE" BUT SEEKS MARCH 14 PRESIDENT BEIRUT 00001724 001.2 OF 005 Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY------- 1. (C) Describing Hizballah as "evil," Saudi AmbassadorAbdulaziz Khoja said that Syria and Hizballah want topostpone presidential elections indefinitely. But a March14-provoked absolute majority ("half plus one") electionwould also be destructive for Lebanon, he argued, and SaudiArabia opposes this approach. Conceding this his friend JeanObeid has no chance at Lebanon's highest office, Khojarevived what is jokingly called the "N-and-N deal" -- NassibLahoud (March 14's top choice) would become president inreturn for a deal on a transitional, technocratic cabinetheaded by Najib Mikati (associated with March 8). Thecabinet's job would be to oversee legislative electionswithin a year. To protect its interest, the March 14 bloc,by controlling the parliamentary and cabinet majority, couldtopple the Mikati cabinet anytime it veered in the wrongdirection. 2. (S) Selling such an idea to Saad Hariri will not beeasy, Khoja noted: while Saudi King Abdullah counseledHariri to wait until after legislative elections beforebecoming prime minister, Hariri does not yet see thatassuming the premiership now is a trap that will destroy himpolitically and perhaps literally. Moreover, Khoja said(alluding to certain MPs), March 14 no longer has the votesfor a half-plus-one presidency and thus needs a fall-back.Meeting with the Ambassador separately, Walid Jumblatt saidthat he liked Khoja's approach, but only if Hariri wereconvinced. Nassib Lahoud said that he cannot play any rolein determining who is prime minister, but, should he bepresident with Mikati as premier, "we can make it work."Khoja also claimed that the threat information announced byHariri in Cairo is serious: Saudi Arabia is convinced thatBashar al-Asad's brother-in-law Assaf Shawkat is plotting tomurder both Hariri and Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. Endsummary. THREATS AGAINST HARIRI, SINIORA,KHOJA: SERIOUS INFORMATION------------------------------- 3. (S) On 11/3, the Ambassador met with Saudi AmbassadorAbdulaziz Khoja. Khoja, who since receiving threatinformation in summer has been mostly absent from Lebanon,said that the Saudis are convinced that the dangers are real.Khoja said that he found March 8 politician Wi'am Wihab'scondemnations of him to be particularly alarming, sinceWihab's slander is often followed by physical attacks. Forthat reason, Khoja expected that he would continue to spendmost of his time in Saudi Arabia. As for the threatsannounced by Saad Hariri when visiting Egypt last week, Khojainsisted that they, too, are serious. Saudi Arabia isconvinced that Assaf Shawkat, Bashar al-Asad'sbrother-in-law, is indeed plotting to kill both Hariri andLebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. "The king is veryworried," Khoja said. SAUDI ARABIA: OPPOSES VACUUM,AND OPPOSES HALF-PLUS-ONE PRESIDENT----------------------------------- 4. (S) Turning to Lebanese political developments, Khojaused uncharacteristically harsh language in describingHizballah as "evil." Syria and Hizballah do not wantpresidential elections, Khoja insisted, and Michel Aoun ishappy to go along with a delay in the hopes his prospects forelections improve. While Parliament Speaker Nabih Berriprefers elections, he has very little flexibility,constrained by Hizballah and Syria. Saudi Arabia wantselections to happen on time. 5. (S) At the same time, Saudi Arabia is adamantly opposedto March 14's proposal to prevent an extension of the statusquo by holding an absolute majority ("half plus one")presidential election. Such an approach will also bedestructive to Lebanon and will permit Syrian-backed thugsand gangs to wreck havoc. King Abdullah has instructed SaadHariri not to move in the direction of absolute majority BEIRUT 00001724 002.2 OF 005 votin. A formula has to be found by which Lebanon avoidboth catastrophes, a presidential void or a hal-plus-onepresidency. While he believes that hi personal friend JeanObeid would have been a god consensus choice, Khoja saidthat he now recogizes that neither March 14 leaders nor theMaronies accept Obeid. "I don't know why," Khoja saidsadly; "Jean is good." The Ambassador did not coment. MUSING ABOUT DEAL: NASSIB LAHOUDAS PREIDENT, AND NAJIB MIKATI AS PM----------------------------------- 6. (C) Claiming that it was hopeless" to wait for theMaronites to solve theproblem of the presidency, Khoja saidthat he wa thinking about reviving what has been jokinglyescribed as the "N-and-N" proposal: Persuade Marc 8-AounMPs to participate in a vote that elects assib Lahoud, March14's top candidate, to the pesidency for six years, andpersuade March 14 toselect Najib Mikati (close to March 8)as prime inister for a transitional period. Each side thengets something. The transitional Mikati cabinet ould becharged with overhauling the legislativeelection law andprocess, with legislative electons to take place within ayear. The cabinet wold be technocratic in nature, similarto the sprng 2005 Mikati cabinet. After the legislativeelctions, a more normal political cabinet would comeintooffice, under a PM from the side that won te most seats inthe legislative elections. COSTRAINTS ON MIKATI SERVEAS ASSURANCES TO MARCH 4--------------------------- 7. (C) March 1 would have certain assurances, Khojaargued. B retaining the parliamentary majority prior tolgislative elections, March 14 could strip the cabiet ofits vote of confidence at any moment. By aving well overhalf the ministers (who, even if echnocratic, will havepolitical masters), March14 can also topple the cabinetthrough mass miniterial resignations. The combination ofthe pariamentary majority and the March 14 presidency woudthen ensure that the replacement cabinet would derive morefully from March 14. 8. (C) Mikati would know this and thus not push apro-Syrian agenda, Khoja argued. Moreover, the Mikatifamily's considerable financial empire, worth billions,imposes a moderating influence on Mikati's politicalbehavior, since the notoriously tight-fisted Mikati would beunlikely to risk potential financial sanctions or propertyfreezes. As a Sunni from Tripoli, Mikati would also besensitive to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, for fear thatmerely lukewarm support would destroy his political prospectsforever. WHILE WARY OF MIKATI, HARIRISHOULD SEE PREMIERSHIP NOW AS A TRAP------------------------------------ 9. (C) The Ambassador said that there was one key problemto Khoja's proposal: Saad Hariri would understandably bewary of conceding the premiership to someone who could usethe billions available to him and the powers of the office tosupplant Hariri as Lebanon's rimary Sunni political leader.Mikati could destry Hariri's power base in Tripolipermanently. Koja accepted the point, but he argued thatHariri needed to wake up to the fact that accepting thepremiership now, in advance of legislative elections, was atrap. The Syrians and Hizballah would block and cripple anyHariri cabinet in ways that the voters would turn away fromthe ineffective Hariri cabinet. Hariri's political powercould be permanently destroyed, and perhaps Hariri himselfwould be eliminated physically. It is far better for Haririto allow someone else to be prime minister until after poweris consolidated in the next legislative elections and untilsome equilibrium is restored in the Syrian-Lebaneserelationship. Hariri should spend the next yearconcentrating on how to win the legislative elections. 10. (S) Already, Khoja said, King Abdullah has counseledHariri to wait until after legislative elections beforebecoming premier. While Hariri had no choice but to say, BEIRUT 00001724 003.2 OF 005 "yes, sir," he then went to Khoja to plead for help inconvincing the king to change his mind. It will not be easyto persuade Hariri, Khoja conceded, who compared Saad aspotential "kingmaker rather than king" with the role somehoped, in vain, Michel Aoun might agree to play. MIKATI AS PM IN 2005: NOT NECESSARILYGUIDE TO HOW MIKATI WOULD BE AS PM IN 2008------------------------------------ 11. (S) The Ambassador told Khoja he had a few concernswith the "N-and-N" proposal. First, while Mikati wasextremely easy to work with during the spring 2005transitional, technocratic cabinet phase, Mikati was thenoperating under the illusion that, if he performed well, theHariris might bring him back as PM. They did not, and thushe might try to consolidate pro-Syrian positions now, in thebelief that his political future rested only with that side.Second, there is the risk that the March 8 leaders will takeonly half of Khoja's idea -- Mikati as PM -- and try tonegotiate another candidate for the president. Third, Mikatimight use the premiership to distort the electoral process inways that reversed all of the pro-independence gains since2005. Khoja agreed that there were potential dangers, but hemaintained that sufficient checks and balances wouldconstrain Mikati. March 14, by having the presidency, theparliamentary majority, and the cabinet majority, has theprimary power, he said. NO HALF-PLUS-ONE PRESIDENT POSSIBLE;MARCH 14 NO LONGER HAS THE VOTES------------------------------------ 12. (S) Almost as an afterthought, Khoja then said thatMarch 14 no longer can pull off a half-plus-one presidentialelections in any case, as the bloc does not have sufficientvotes for that approach. Even if Saad Hariri defies KingAbdullah's wishes and goes with his allies for an absolutemajorit vote, March 14 will not have 64 votes, Khojadecared. March 14 needs a fall-back approach, and th"N-and-N" proposal is better than many others uderdiscussion. The Ambassador noted that March 14 actually has68 MPs. Khoja expressed confidence that those 68 would voteas a bloc if the "two-thirds quorum" of all MPs was attained.But not all March 14 MPs will vote in the absence of anyMarch 8-Aoun MPs and be seen as provoking a political andsecurity crisis. Khoja used the example of MP MohammedSafadi. Saudi Arabia theoretically could ask him to go toparliament, given Safadi's business ties with Prince Turkibin Nasser. But since King Abdullah is opposed to ahalf-plus-one election anyway, Saudi Arabia would not askSafadi to participate. JUMBLATT: IF SAAD CAN BE CONVINCED,KHOJA HAS A GOOD IDEA----------------------------------- 13. (C) In a separate meeting, the Ambassador briefed MPWalid Jumblatt about Khoja's thinking. Jumblatt (who earlierin the week had hosted Khoja to dinner, when Khoja was stilltouting Jean Obeid as president) said that he liked the idea,as "we have to give them (the March 8 opposition) something."From Jumblatt's perspective, this accomplished three goals:First, March 14 secured the presidency for six years.Second, Hariri delayed taking the premiership pending a morefavorable political and security climate. Third, thecompromise March 14 would have to make regarding the PM wasfar less painful than making a compromise on the president,since the cabinet could always be changed and "improved"later. But Saad Hariri will have to be convinced, Jumblattsaid, noting that he would not risk splitting March 14 ifHariri did not approve. NASSIB LAHOUD: CAN MAKE IT WORK-------------------------------- 14. (C) In a subsequent meeting with the Ambassador, NassibLahoud distanced himself from any deal-making over thepremiership. The president, he noted, has no discretion onchoosing the PM, who is selected by a binding consultativeprocess by the MPs. Lahoud said that he wanted to avoid anyappearance of violating constitutional practices. But if BEIRUT 00001724 004.2 OF 005 Najib Mikati would become a transitional PM, Lahoud said that"we can make it work." Besides getting Saad Hariri on board,Lahoud noted that Khoja would have to work very hard toconvince the March 14 MPs from northern Lebanon, who wouldfear that Mikati would find ways to erode their 2005 gainsagainst pro-Syrian politicians. COMMENT------- 15. (C) Given their razor-thin but surviving parliamentarymajority, March 14 MPs should theoretically be able to electa president, select a prime minister, and form a cabinet, allfrom March 14 ranks. That is obviously the scenario we wouldlike to see. That is the outcome we continue to do all wecan to help produce. 16. (C) But the sky-is-falling stories of potential chaosand catastrophe have eroded both March 14 bloc discipline andinternational solidarity. We suspect Khoja is correct thatMarch 14 would have trouble mustering 64 MPs (the minimumneeded for an absolute majority election), and anything lessthan 68 MPs would be deeply embarrassing to March 14. Weknow from our diplomatic colleagues that, at best, somecountries will reluctantly accept a half-plus-one election asa last resort, but it seems that all except the United Statesare actively working to find a compromise solution instead,some (maybe even Saudi Arabia) at almost any cost. It isimportant to note that one essential factor for the successof an absolute majority president -- Maronite PatriarchSfeir's blessing -- remains uncertain. 17. (C) It is still possible that a genuine consensuscandidate (or "half-plus-plus" candidate) committed to March14 ideals might emerge. Sheikh Michel Khoury's name, forexample, has circulated with increasing frequency; he, in ourview, would be fine. And perhaps Vatican and Maronitepressure might yet result in sufficient attendance at theparliamentary session to give sufficient credibility to theelections of a March 14 president. But we recommend keepingKhoja's proposed linkage in mind. If a compromise is neededsomewhere at this time, we'd rather see it in the premiershipthan the presidency. March 14 will still have theparliamentary majority, meaning the cabinet could be changedat any time. A new legislative election law will have to beapproved in the parliament, meaning March 14 (as long as ithas a majority and maintains solidarity) has final say overthe organization for legislative elections. 18. (C) The danger is that a compromise over the presidencycombined with the "blocking/toppling third" in the cabinetthat the pro-Syrians will insist upon puts March 14 inpotentially a worse position than it is today, no matter howstellar a good PM's March 14 credentials might be. Thepro-Syrian ministers could not topple Siniora's cabinet ayear ago because they did not have sufficient numbers to doso. In a new cabinet, they are likely to have that third,meaning that they can topple the cabinet at will. This isnot an insurmountable problem if the president is March 14:he can work with the parliamentary majority to see that thereplacement cabinet is an improvement, without a topplingthird given again to the pro-Syrians. But if the presidentis weak or under Syrian influence, he will likely use hissignatory power over the cabinet formation -- signatory powerthat cannot be overridden -- to insist again that thepro-Syrians have the toppling third, continuing the cycle ofpro-Syrian vetoes over cabinet action. 19. (C) All of this argues, of course, for a crediblepresident committed to March 14 principles as the first stepto resolving Lebanon's political crisis. Even though in ourview there is no presidential candidate better than NassibLahoud, elevating Nassib via Khoja's "N-and-N" proposal isnot ideal. Saad Hariri in particular can cite many reasonsin rejecting this approach. This proposal, in fact, wouldnot be worth a moment's consideration under any othercombination of names: it wouldn't work if wheeler-dealerBoutros Harb were substituted for Nassib Lahoud, or if OmarKarami (impervious to modern thinking and insouciant abouthis international reputation) filled in for Mikati. Thecombination of the strong character of Nassib Lahoud andLebanon's experience with PM Mikati during a transition BEIRUT 00001724 005.2 OF 005 period is what intrigues us, and probably Jumblatt. While wewon't pursue this as we concentrate on how to promote apresident, PM, and cabinet all committed to March 14principles, we will monitor Khoja's progress in trying tofind ways to sell a Nassib Lahoud presidency that we, too,would support.FELTMAN�LEBANON: GEAGEA WARNS OF DANGEROUS GAMES, AND IS PLAYING ONE OF HIS OWN id: 129529date: 11/9/2007 14:21refid: 07BEIRUT1760origin: Embassy Beirutclassification: CONFIDENTIALdestination:header:VZCZCXRO3021OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROVDE RUEHLB #1760/01 3131421ZNY CCCCC ZZHO 091421Z NOV 07FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUTTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0019INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 0856RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITYRUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1671RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1850RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITYRHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY----------------- header ends ----------------C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001760 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2017TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, PARM, SY, IS, LESUBJECT: LEBANON: GEAGEA WARNS OF DANGEROUS GAMES, AND ISPLAYING ONE OF HIS OWN BEIRUT 00001760 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b)and (d). SUMMARY------- 1. (C) Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea does not supportFrance's efforts to convince the Patriarch to provide namesof presidential candidates, fearing that, without an adequatesafety net, this would lead to a weak president susceptibleto Syrian and Hizballah influence. Citing Nassib Lahoud,Boutros Harb, and Charles Rizk (as a fallback) as the onlyacceptable candidates, Geagea said if no consensus is reachedby the midnight November 23 expiration of President Lahoud'smandate, March 14 would proceed with a half plus one vote.He conceded that this approach could lead to "skirmishes" andpossible Hizballah takeover of parts of the country, thoughhe predicted Hizballah would use "proxies" rather be directlyimplicated in any ensuing violence. He ruled out any chanceof an Aoun presidency, but predicted that Aoun would fight tothe end. In a one-on-one pull-aside with the Ambassador atthe end, Geagea expressed deep concern that Saad Hariri waspoised for unacceptable compromise over the presidency, astep that Geagea feared would destroy March 14 credibilityamong the Christians. Geagea was dismayed that Hariri, inhis view, has abandoned the "half-plus-one" optionprematurely. End summary. 2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, metwith Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea at his residence inMaarab on November 8. Geagea advisors Joseph Nehme, ElieKhoury, and Jean-Marie Kassab also attended the meeting. FRENCH INITIATIVE MUSH HAVE SAFETY NET-------------------------------- 3. (C) The Ambassador, who met with Patriarch Sfeirimmediately prior to the meeting with Geagea (septel),compared notes with Geagea on the mechanism for choosingLebanon's next president and compared notes on the currentFrench proposal (to encourage the Patriarch to provide a listof five presidential candidates to present to ParliamentSpeaker Nabih Berri and majority leader Saad Hariri). Sfeir,the Ambassador noted, stated that he doesn't want to givenames. But he also adamantly opposes a half plus onepresident (i.e., one elected by absolute majority) andinsists on having a new president by November 24. TheAmbassador told Geagea he had stressed to the Patriarch thatthe U.S. would not compromise on principles but wanted tohelp. The Patriarch suggested that the U.S. consult with thevarious parties to help them come up with a list to take toparliament. The goods news, the Ambassador said, is that thePatriarch is insisting on parliament's role in electing thepresident. 4. (C) Geagea, focusing on the Patriarch's rejection of halfplus one, said that March 14 had no choice but to proceedwith it at "the right time." Saad had told him the nightbefore that he would only accept the French initiative if itcame with a "safety net" attached, i.e., if Berri and Saadcannot agree on a candidate, the list goes to parliament todecide. The list probably would consist of Free PatrioticMovement leader Michel Aoun, Nassib Lahoud, Boutros Harb, andtwo others, one of which Saad says March 14 should be able toinfluence and one "wild card." The French, Geagea said(quoting contacts with unnamed French officials), wereundecided on the safety net: Sarkozy advisor Jean-DavideLevitte reported was against the idea, while Boris Boillonwas in favor, and Claude Gueant appeared to be undecided butunenthusiastic. STRONG OPPOSITION TO WEAK CANDIDATE----------------------------------- 5. (C) "We can't endure six more years of a president whocannot stand up to Syrian and Hizballah influence," Geageasaid. We will block the election, "if not by will, bynecessity." Fortunately, he added, the Patriarch is notgiving names, even though the Europeans are pushing him to.He himself would push Sfeir not to do so, since there was noguarantee he would come up with good candidates. Maybe wecan insert Minister of Justice Charles Rizk, he suggested, as BEIRUT 00001760 002.2 OF 004 the only fall-back to March 14 candidates Nassib Lahoud andBoutros Harb. 6. (C) The French were talking about five or six names,including two "loose" names, Geagea said, but were too easilyfooled by the Syrians, who by virtue of physical proximityhave a much better understanding of the nature of the game.If Saad stays firm, the French initiative wouldn't be aproblem, Geagea commented. The Ambassador noted that Haririmight be tempted to go along with a weak candidate in orderto ensure that he becomes the next prime minister, a scenariothat completely excludes Aoun and Geagea. And Hizballah,Geagea added with a smile. 7. (C) Joseph Torbey is a perfect example, the Ambassadorcontinued, noting that Berri could live with him. Geagea,noting that he had met Torbey several times, said he could"not locate him politically." Kassab added that Torbey is a"perfectly neutral businessman" who is politically "odorless"but would have no ability to stand up to Syria and Hizballah-- a "catastrophe" for March 14. Khoury agreed, sayingTorbey is just a banker, with no political orientation. Solet's gain some time, Geagea suggested, by supporting Torbey,securing the Patriarch and Berri's blessings, then let theSyrians dismiss him. The Ambassador noted that, due toTorbey's connection to Credit Lyonais in which the majorshareholders are the Saudis, many predict that the Syrianswere likely to object to his name. 8. (C) Kassab suggested Fady Abboud, President of theAssociation of Industrialists, as president, citing hisstrong inclination toward the U.S. and very strong Maronitesensibilities. The Ambassador noted his strong Aounistleanings; Geagea added that he has roots in the Syrianpopular party (Note: He is also the nephew of Syrian VicePresident Shara) and is "allergic" to Lebanese Forces.(Comment: This was truly a bizarre suggestion that makes onesuspicious of Kassab. The Ambassador saw Abboud at a dinnerlater on 11/8. Abboud proceeded to attack polemically March14, reserving particular ire for the Lebanese Forces. Endcomment.) GEAGEA INTENT ON PURSUING HALF PLUS ONE PRESIDENT------------------------------------- 9. (C) The Ambassador noted that many powerful voices werecounseling against a half plus one vote. Geagea disagreed.He reported that Lebanese Forces MPs Elie Kairouz and SetridaGeagea (Samir's wife) had recently held a long discussionwith Saudi Arabian Ambassador to Lebanon Khoja, in whichKhoja never told them not to proceed with a half plus onevote. Geagea added that his impression from other Saudicontacts was also that they were not opposed. For the lasttwo weeks the Saudis have been supporting half plus one hesaid, although they of course would prefer consensus -- on aMarch 14 candidate. The Ambassador commented that the Saudismight accept a half plus one vote as a last resort only, butthey would need to have the Patriarch on board. Geagearesponded that the Patriarch would only be on board at thelast minute, after all other efforts failed. 10. (C) The Ambassador suggested that March 14 should notproceed with the half plus one option explicitly as itsopening hand; rather, it needed to show it had exhausted allother options first to decrease the perception that it waspreempting a solution. Geagea, agreeing that even BoutrosHarb was dreaming if he thought he could secure more than anabsolute majority, said there was no other solution than halfplus one, though he admitted that March 14 was not playingits cards well. Lebanese Forces' plan for the next two weekswas half plus one, with either Boutros Harb or Nassib Lahoud,with Charles Rizk as the only possible fallback solution.Jumblatt's plan was the same, he said. ...REGARDLESS OF CONSEQUENCES----------------------------- 11. (C) What will happen on the ground if you proceed, theAmbassador asked? Geagea replied that for the last twoweeks, after a two to three week pause, various groups,including Suleiman Franjieh's Marada, had begun arming again-- except for Aoun. (Note: Franjieh advisor and AmCit BEIRUT 00001760 003.2 OF 004 Richard Haykal explicitly denied that Marada is rearming inan October 30 meeting with Pol/Econ Chief, claimingindividuals, like southern "hicks," had weapons for their ownpersonal defense, but nothing more. Of course, we would notexpect him to say otherwise. Geagea advisors told Pol/EconChief after the meeting that they attributed unwelcome presscoverage as the reason Aoun had ceased rearming. End note.) 12. (C) Geagea predicted the opposition would respond to ahalf plus one president with minor "skirmishes" here andthere. Downplaying the Ambassador's concern that Hizballahis said to have the ability to take over large parts of thecountry, Geagea said they would only be able to take Beirut,the Biqa, and the south. Does Lebanese Forces really want togo that route, the Ambassador asked. Geagea didn't answer,except by acknowledging that Hizballah could "cause hugeproblems." Kassab commented that Hizballah itself probablywould not be involved, but would deploy its "proxies"instead. DANGEROUS GAMES--------------- 13. (C) It's a dangerous game, Geagea admitted, one we playedbefore when Elias Hrawi was elected president in 1989. Keepin mind that we have a terrorist enemy and we cannot employterrorist means against him. Any neutral president would besucked in by that enemy. Left alone, someone like Torbeywould be an okay president, but in this game a weak presidentwould lead to increased marginalization of the Christians.Therefore, Nassib Lahoud and Boutros Harb are the minimumaccepted candidates. 14. (C) Does March 14 have an absolute majority, theAmbassador asked. Yes, Geagea stated confidently, claimingTripoli bloc MP Mohamed Safadi was firmly on board, though headmitted he didn't know about Future Movement MP GhassanTueini. But people need to feel the threat of a presidentialvacancy, he argued, for the half plus one to proceed, sayingthat March 14 would wait until November 24 (the day afterPresident Lahoud's mandate expires) to proceed with the vote. 15. (C) Geagea rejected the Ambassador's suggestion that, ifit came to this, the Patriarch might get desperate andproduce names, saying that the two major Christian leaders(we presume he meant Aoun and himself) were telling him notto. But if Saad gets his safety net, the game is not sodangerous, the Ambassador pointed out. If he does, Geageasaid, we'll accept; at least that way we'll have half of theChristians on board. But Saad doesn't know yet whether theFrench will agree. AOUN WILL FIGHT 'TIL THE END---------------------------- 16. (C) Geagea said Aoun had called him the previous Saturdaysuggesting a meeting, to which Geagea replied he was welcomeany time (i.e., at Geagea's residence in Maarab). Aounreportedly didn't accept, suggesting the Patriarch'sresidence in Bkirke instead. Geagea agreed, but then Aoundid an about-face and insisted on his residence in Rabieh.Suleiman Franjieh, meanwhile, told Geagea the week beforethat he was ready to meet at Bkirke, presumably as aknee-jerk reaction to Aoun's meeting with March 14 MP SamirGeagea, his cousin and arch-rival. Franjieh then suddenlychanged his mind, due, Geagea guessed, to Syrian opposition. 17. (C) Does Aoun recognize that he won't be president, theAmbassador asked. Yes and no, Geagea replied; "he will fightuntil the end." Then he risks losing everything, theAmbassador pointed out. That's your calculation, Geagearesponded, Aoun doesn't calculate. DESPAIR OVER SAAD HARIRI------------------------ 18. (C) Ushering the others out of the room, Geagea thenpaced, one-on-one, around his office with the Ambassador,fretting about his two-hour meeting the previous evening withHariri. Hariri, he said, is well-intentioned. But he isoblivious to Christian sensibilities. Hariri is ready to BEIRUT 00001760 004.2 OF 004 make a deal on a weak president, and he has all but abandonedthe idea of using a half-plus-one absolute majority vote.This puts March 14 Christians in a terrible bind. If they goalong with a president like Joseph Torbey or Robert Ghanem,their credibility is destroyed: the Sunnis, and the Haririsin particular, will have proven once again that they do notwant partners but servants. Yet, if March 14 Christianleaders do not go along with a deal announced by Hariri, thenthey risk splitting March 14. 19. (C) But, Geagea warned, if he has to choose betweenbacking a weak figure like Robert Ghanem to preserve March 14unity or preserving his Christian credibility by breakingwith Hariri over a bad presidential choice, he will chose thelatter. Geagea said that he would have no choice but tobuild an alliance with Aoun, lest all of his followers shiftto Aoun on their own. "You have to work on Saad," Geageasaid. "Convince him that he can't ignore his Christianpartners," persuade him that, in the Sunni struggle againstHizballah, Hariri will need the Christians on his side."Thank God for Walid," Geagea commented, referring toJumblatt remaining steadfast in his support of a strong,credible President. Geagea lamented that Hariri is so readyto abandon the "half plus one" electoral strategy, when thatmay be the only option to get a strong candidate withChristian credibility who is not Michel Aoun. COMMENT------- 20. (C) Geagea's concern with Saad Hariri is worrying:March 14 needs to stay united beyond the presidentialelections. Indeed, picking a prime minister, forming agovernment, and writing a government program may turn out tobe even more difficult tasks than electing a president. IfMarch 14 is divided, Hizballah and other Syrian proxies willremain in lockstep and thus more likely to increase theirinfluence at the expense of the divided March 14 movement. 21. (C) While Geagea in the end will probably stick withMarch 14 for lack of a better alternative -- especially asMichel Aoun seems in no mood to reciprocate Geagea'stentative flirtation -- we suspect that he is right aboutSaad in one important aspect: Saad is ready to make a deal,almost any deal, with March 8 in order to put thepresidential crisis behind him. Having watched his fatherand Nabih Berri share control over President Elias Hrawi (inoffice 1989-1998), Saad may very well underestimate theimportance of the presidency to his allies.FELTMAN�LEBANON'S PRESIDENCY: GHANEM, EDDE, SALAMEH STILL IN PLAY; SLEIMAN LURKING IN THE BACKGROUND id: 130891date: 11/20/2007 16:50refid: 07BEIRUT1820origin: Embassy Beirutclassification: SECRETdestination:header:VZCZCXRO1385OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROVDE RUEHLB #1820/01 3241650ZNY SSSSS ZZHO 201650Z NOV 07FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUTTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0221INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 0891RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITYRHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITYRUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1901----------------- header ends ----------------S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001820 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA FRONT OFFICE AND NEA/ELA; NSC FORABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/27TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, KDEM, LE, SY, FRSUBJECT: LEBANON'S PRESIDENCY: GHANEM, EDDE, SALAMEH STILLIN PLAY; SLEIMAN LURKING IN THE BACKGROUND BEIRUT 00001820 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY AND COMMENT------------------- 1. (S) Despite French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner andSpecial Envoy Jean-Claude Cousseran shuttling among the majorpolitical players, the French initiative to solve Lebanon'spresidential election crisis is faltering. Only three namesfrom the Patriarch's original list of seven potentialcandidates remain in play, but all pose serious problems:Robert Ghanem, whom the French are pushing Nabih Berri toaccept, is fine with Saad Hariri but an anathema to March 14Christians, who threaten to bolt. Hariri, in turn, isresisting pressure to accept an interim presidency in theform of Michel Edde. The third, Riad Salameh, would requirea constitutional amendment that the Lebanese army want to useto promote LAF Commander Michel Sleiman instead. Despite hisabsence from the Patriarch's list, Sleiman still seems to bethe pro-Syrian stealth candidate of choice. 2. (S) With threats of vacuum and chaos in the aftermath ofthe expiration of Emile Lahoud's presidential terms, theMarch 14 majority is on the verge of splitting apart. Giventhe presumed bounties on their heads, its leaders havedifficulty meeting and coordinating positions. WalidJumblatt, detecting an absence of tangible internationalsupport for March 14 candidates, now advocates backingSleiman -- on the theory that Syria won't rest until Sleimanbecomes president, and it's better for March 14 to supportSleiman's presidential bid than to oppose it. We are urgingMarch 14 leaders to view all initiatives in light of the needto maintain March 14 unity for the difficult exercise offorming a cabinet and cabinet program. 3. (S) With the French initiative, March 14's majorityposition has become irrelevant, in favor of "consensus" (thatin practice has meant giving Berri the right to vetocandidates). The French initiative will expire along withEmile Lahoud's presidential term at midnight on 11/23. If noconsensus candidate emerges before Friday night, we believethat we need to prepare the international community now torestore the concept of majority-minority to the process. Forexample, a French-U.S.-Egyptian-Saudi-Vatican statementcalling on the Patriarch's list to be submitted to parliamenteither in its entirety or stripped of its "political" names(leaving four for the MPs to choose from) would reinvigoratelagging March 14 morale and restore some element of democracyto Lebanon's presidential elections in favor of the side wewish to see prevail. End summary and comment. FROM SEVEN TO ZERO: BERRI AND HARIRIDEMOLISH PATRIARCH'S LIST OF CANDIDATES------------------------- 4. (S) Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and Saad Hariri mettwice over last weekend, but they failed to make progress onidentifying consensus names of presidential candidates totake to parliament. The Patriarch's list, as is now known,contains seven names: March 14 candidates Nassib Lahoud andBoutros Harb, March 8 candidate Michel Aoun, MP RobertGhanem, former Minister Michel Khoury, former Minister MichelEdde, and Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh. (Salameh'sname was added, we understand, only at the last minute, atthe French request and with a caveat: if Salameh is seen asneeding a constitutional amendment to overcome the requisitecooling-off period for some senior civil servants, then thelist has only six, not seven, names.) 5. (S) Predictably, Berri vetoed Lahoud and Harb, whileHariri vetoed Aoun. Berri also nixed Michel Khoury, sayingthat he was too close to March 14. Unexpectedly, givenpreviously warm hints, Berri also rejected MP Robert Ghanem,describing him to visitors as "100 percent March 14," adescription that would astonish Ghanem and March 14stalwarts. Hariri then said no to Edde, and Berri pronouncedthat Salameh would need a constitutional amendment.Seemingly, all of the Patriarch's candidates had been felledby the dueling vetoes. GHANEM, EDDE, SALAMEH BACK IN PLAY----------------------------- BEIRUT 00001820 002.2 OF 003 6. (S) In the meantime, March 8-Aoun continues to threatenviolence, chaos, and demonstrations, should a president notbe elected by the expiration of Emile Lahoud's presidentialterm at midnight on 11/23. The threats of physical takeoverof government facilities seem credible. This has provokedextreme unease on the part of March 14 leaders, who haveresponded to French and Arab calls to try again to reachconsensus. French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, whotold the Ambassador on 11/20 that it was "unacceptable" thatno candidate from the Patriarch's list could serve as aconsensus, has also pushed the political leaders from bothsides to try again for consensus. 7. (S) March 14 fears and the international push forconsensus have come together to revive three names from thePatriarch's original seven. But all pose what may beinsurmountable problems: -- Robert Ghanem: The French are pushing Nabih Berri tolift his veto on this fence-sitting MP. Berri, in fact, mayextract a high enough price that he would do so. Theadvantage to Ghanem is that part of Michel Aoun's bloc hasstated its intention to go for Ghanem, should he emerge asthe consensus candidate. Splitting the Aoun bloc should bea strategic victory for March 14. The problem with Ghanem isthat March 14 Christians, from Samir Geagea through BoutrosHarb, do not consider him to have sufficient weight in theMaronite community to withstand the populist attacks MichelAoun will launch against him. March 14 Christians havethreatened to bolt, should Ghanem (who Hariri convincedJumblatt to accept) prevail. -- Michel Edde: The octogenarian Edde has the Maroniteweight (literal as well as figurative) that Ghanem lacks, so,curiously, March 14 Christians seem to tolerate him despitehis known connections to Syrian intelligence via the odiousMichel Samaha. Samir Geagea accepts him as a fall-back.Berri and Hizballah are reportedly thrilled with Edde.Because Edde has hinted that he would step down less than twoyears into a six-year presidential term (allowing a newpresident to be elected after 2009 parliamentary elections),Michel Aoun is also said to be intrigued by Edde, whom theFrench also like. The trouble is Saad Hariri, who has somefamily grudges with Edde and who has heard too many reportsof Edde's Sunni-bashing. For Edde to prevail, Hariri -- whois the majority leader, after all -- would have to be the oneto surrender. We are uncomfortable telling Saad, who hasdemonstrated much flexibility, to cross yet another red linein Berri's direction. -- Riad Salameh: The enigmatic Central Banker seems to havebegrudging acceptance from Hariri and -- depending on thesource -- more enthusiastic backing from Hizballah and Berri.His name popped back into the fray unexpectedly over theweekend, when Hariri pitched him to Berri. But theconstitutional amendment issue hinders his chances: if theMPs vote to change the constitution to elect him, then theLebanese Armed Forces officers and soldiers will likelyresent that Salameh got the nod while LAF Commander MichelSleiman (who also faces a two-year constitutional cooling-offperiod before being eligible for the presidency) did not. MICHEL SLEIMAN: THE STEALTH CANDIDATE?----------------------------- 8. (S) Many March 14 supporters believe that LAF CommanderMichel Sleiman, in fact, remains the candidate of choice forSyria and Hizballah. According to their theory, EmileLahoud's presidential term will expire, March 8 will findways of provoking violence. In the mayhem that follows,Sleiman will emerge as the natural savior. Walid Jumblatt,in fact, is so worried at what he sees as a lack of tangibleinternational support for March 14 presidential candidatesthat he is now advocating that March 14 throw its supportbehind Sleiman. In Jumblatt's view, if it is inevitable thatLebanon is facing a Sleiman presidency, it would be betterfor March 14 to create that presidency than to block it.Saad Hariri, we believe, will be susceptible to thesearguments, and Michel Murr would happily split from MichelAoun's bloc to support Sleiman. (We ourselves would find iteasier to deal with a Sleiman presidency than, say, a MichelEdde regime.) BEIRUT 00001820 003.2 OF 003 IF THE FRENCH INITIATIVE FAILS,USING THE FAILURE AS AN OPPORTUNITY----------------------------- 9. (S) Marwan Hamadeh has noted, acidly, that the Frenchinitiative has already accomplished much: it brought theSyrians formally back into Lebanese decision making regardingthe presidency, it damaged the unity of March 14, it erasedthe concept of "majority" and minority" in favor of aconsensus where March 14 and March 8 have equal weight, itrestored to prominence the once-discredited pro-SyrianMaronite Suleiman Franjieh, and it eliminated ... Source: http://www.tayyar.org/Tayyar/News/PoliticalNews/en-US/Wikileaks-Michel-Sleiman-mt-64683.htm La Liga Kevin Campbell Russia Beach holidays Australia cricket team Private equity Subscribe to: Post Comments (Atom) Followers Blog Archive ►  2012 (455) ►  February (143) ►  January (312) ▼  2011 (2135) ►  December (372) ►  November (345) ►  October (362) ►  September (347) ►  August (51) ▼  April (265) Want to be a wwoofer? Notts fugitive who fled to Pakistan rearrested ove... 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